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Introduction
Water transfer has and continues to be a complementary water management strategy for
promoting socioeconomic development in water-scarce regions. Over 2,500 years ago, the
Babylonians, the Roman Empire and the Chinese constructed extensive canal networks, famous
aqueducts and the Grand Canal, respectively to support human settlement in water- scarce
areas. The Anuradhapura Kingdom of Sri Lanka too, developed major water transfers as far
back as 100 AD to support the irrigation civilization needed to feed a growing population (de
Silva 2005). In the twentieth century, the phenomenal population growth, economic activities
and human settlement in water-scarce regions, advances in science and technology, political
will and availability of resources led to the development of many water transfer projects. The
global inter-basin water transfer increased from 22 to 56, from 56 to 257 and from 257 to 364
km3 yr-1 during the periods 1900-1940, 1940-1980 and 1980-1986, respectively, and is estimated
to increase to 760-1,240 km3 yr-1 by 2020 (Shiklomanov 1999). Most of these transfers took
place in Canada, the former USSR, India and the United States of America.
The benefits of these transfers have been considerable. Well-implemented water transfer
schemes have supported socioeconomic development by: (a) enhancing total water benefit
through the transfer of surplus water to a water-scarce basin/region; (b) facilitating re-allocation
of water from a low- to a high-value use; (c) reducing regional inequity by transferring water
to promote socioeconomic development in water-scarce regions; (d) facilitating broader
cooperation and promoting solidarity between donor and recipient regions; and (e) restoring
degraded freshwater ecosystems. However, the poor social, financial, economic and
environmental performance of some transfers has contributed to growing criticism. Over the
last 2 decades, most of the planned transfers have stalled. Yet, the Comprehensive Assessment
of Water Management in Agriculture (CA 2007) concluded that, while improved water
management should offset the need for securing new water sources, it cannot do this in all
cases. It postulates that calls for water transfers will likely increase and become louder when
and where the mismatch between supply and demand continues to grow, and efforts to conserve
water have been exhausted.  Tumbare (2001) argued that while the proposed inter-basin water
transfer schemes in southern Africa seem to be pipe-dreams, they will become a reality in the346
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near future due to continued population and economic growth in the region, and as long as
there is scope for a win-win negotiated outcome. He postulated that these schemes will bring
closer ties, economic benefits and co-operation between the various countries. Hence the need
to address the question: how can future water transfer schemes be planned, implemented and
operated cost-effectively and in ways that maximize net benefits and minimize social and
environmental costs?
We posit that there are valuable lessons, both positive and negative, to be learned from
past experiences, and also acknowledge the fact that the future is likely to present new
challenges and opportunities and, hence the need to take a cautious approach.  We, therefore,
contribute to answering the above question by reviewing global experiences of water transfer
and drawing lessons on where, when and how to implement economically, socially,
environmentally and politically acceptable water transfer schemes. We specifically address the
following questions:
• What are the different types of water transfer systems and under what conditions are
they appropriate?
• What are the effects of water transfers on agriculture, food security and poverty?
• What factors facilitate or constrain the effective implementation of water transfer
schemes?
• What changes in policy, legal and organizational framework and in approach to project
design, planning, implementation and operation are required to facilitate the
development of judicious water transfers schemes?
• How can research contribute in informing the debate and in providing solutions to
unforeseen problems?
Types of Water Transfers and Case Studies
Types of Water Transfers
Water transfer is a water management strategy aimed at reducing the mismatch between water
supply and demand by transferring water to augment local supply in water-scarce areas or
reduce damage caused by excess water. Water transfer has three dimensions. First, water can
be transferred from one use/user (donor) to another (recipient). Common examples include the
transfer of water from agricultural to urban use and the transfer of water rights from one user
to another, either through water trading, at the expiry of the water right duration, or where one
user simply takes the water with no compensation to the previous user. Second, the temporal
dimension in which alternative forms of water storage (groundwater recharge, natural or man-
made reservoir) increase water availability in the dry seasons by storing the excess water received
during the rainy seasons. Third, the spatial dimension involving the transfer of water from
one location to another using groundwater pathways, natural waterways, canals and/or
pipelines. These dimensions are not mutually exclusive and in most cases occur in combination.347
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Water transfer requires that there be a social, environmental, political or economic benefit,
which provides the justification to offset: (a) the cost of transferring it; (b) any compensation
demanded by the donor; and (c) any other costs associated with the negative externalities
that the transfer may generate. Generally, water transfer schemes have multiple complementary
objectives that include:
• To increase total water benefit by transferring surplus water to a water-scarce basin/
region,1 as is described in the Brazil case study included in this paper;
• To facilitate re-allocation of water from a low- to a high-value use;2
• To reduce regional inequity by transferring water to promote socioeconomic
development in water-scarce regions;3
• To meet treaty, agreement or other legal obligations;
• To facilitate broader cooperation and promote solidarity between donor and recipient
regions;4 and
• To restore degraded freshwater ecosystems.5
As stated above, there are a wide range of transfers, and a variety of terms associated
with them.  In this paper, we classify water transfers based on the geographic scope as follows:
• inter-project - transfer within a water project;
• intra-basin –  transfer from one subbasin to another in the same basin; and
1 For example, Egypt plans to promote the use of water saving technologies and transfer the water
saved to irrigate 168,420 hectares of reclaimed dessert and provide opportunities for 3 million people
(Tafesse 2001).
2 For example, the experiences in China and western USA, in which large quantities of water are being
transferred from agriculture to urban use, agriculture to agriculture, urban to urban and agriculture to
environment. These transfers may be by the same user, among users within a water project or from one
administrative/hydrologic unit to another.
3 For example, the Rio-Sao Francisco inter-basin diversions whose objectives are to meet rural water
requirements, promote urban and industrial growth and stimulate irrigation development in the drought-
prone parts of Sao Francisco Basin, Brazil (Kemper et al. 2002).
4 For example, planned diversions by Egypt’s el-Salam (peace) canal to Israel and Palestine (Dinar and
Wolf 1997) and by Turkey (peace pipeline project) to transfer water to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and
other Arabian Gulf states (Rende 2004).
5 By addressing environmental constraints through the use of transferred water to meet environmental
flow requirements; reduce over-use of surface water, groundwater and water in wetlands and thereby
sustain freshwater dependent ecosystems; and improve water quality by trading low-quality water for
higher quality water and reducing agricultural pollution by transferring water to other non-polluting uses.348
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• inter-basin6 - transfer from one basin to another basin.  This is further sub-divided
into short and long inter-basin transfers.  In the case of the former, the transfer is to
a basin immediately adjacent to the donor basin, whereas with the latter, it may cross
multiple basins.
Other defining characteristics of a water transfer arrangement include:
• Types of water: the transfer may involve surface, ground, wastewater (reclaimed,
treated, or untreated), brackish and even saline water.  For the sake of completeness,
it could also include virtual water, that is through trade.
• Water transfer route: can be direct (above or below ground pipelines, open or closed
canals, and natural waterways) or in-direct7 as in the case of groundwater flow.
• Water transfer duration: these include permanent, long-term and short-term transfers
of a water right.
• Water transfer operation criteria: that defines the volume, rate and timing (seasonal,
constant, pulsed or combination) of the water to be transferred.
• Planned or unplanned water transfer:  While the focus of this paper is on planned
transfers, it is important to recognize that there are also unplanned transfers.
Given the above, there is considerable variation on the form of a given transfer, and
generalizations of their appropriateness and/or impacts may be misleading. However, matching
water transfer purpose, type and characteristics with the unique site conditions is an important
step towards reducing negative impacts.
Case Studies
Water Transfers in the Western United States
Using the Colorado Basin case study, we now illustrate how the western states have put in to
practice water transfers.
Sharing Water and Mitigating Negative Impacts: The waters of the Colorado River are shared
by Mexico and seven states of the United States of America. The Colorado River Compact of
1922 divided the water among the Upper (Colorado, Utah and Wyoming) and Lower (New Mexico,
Arizona, Nevada and California) basin states and also among agricultural and urban uses.
6 Inter-basin transfers is the withdrawal of water, more or less continuously over all or part of the year,
by ditch, canal, tunnel or pipeline from its basin of origin for use in another river basin (ICID 2006).
Further specifications include (Davies et al. 1992): (a) the diverted flow does not return to the stream
of origin, or to the permanent stream within 20 km of the point of withdrawal; and (b) the mean annual
flow transferred should not be less than 0.5 m3 s-1.
7 Land and water use and management practices that increase infiltration, groundwater recharge and
augmentation of dry season river flow in downstream reaches are a form of indirect water transfer.349
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The Compact, whose purpose was to allocate the available 17 million acre-feet (21 billion m3) and
protect the water rights of the upper basin, allocated 7.5 million acre-feet (9.2 billion m3) to each
of the two basin areas. Mexico’s water issues were addressed 22 years later in the form of the
United States and Mexico treaty that guaranteed Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet (1.8 billion m3) from
the Colorado River each year. Initially, the focus was on water quantity, and the water quality
issues were revisited later when Mexico threatened to request international sanction for the
increased salinity level of the water it was receiving. The United States agreed to limit the salinity
level to 1,000 ppm. The water salinity would have been met through reduced water transfers and
irrigation return flows. In 1974, to secure that water to the lower basin states, the Federal
Government authorized the construction of the Yuma Desalting Plant, a reverse osmosis facility.
The plant was commissioned in 1992 and tested at 1/3 capacity until late 1993 when the plant
was mothballed as wetter conditions upstream meant that the required salinity levels did not
require the plant’s operation.  Since then, the agricultural drainage water that was intended as
the source water for the plant has been discharged to what was to become the Cienega de Santa
Clara wetlands in Mexico, and efforts to bring the plant into operation have been resisted on
environmental grounds.  The recent droughts in the western United States, and the increasing
demands of a growing population have increased demand on the waters of the Colorado River,
while at the same time there has been increasing awareness of the need to ensure allocations to
the environment.  Given this, early in 2007 the United State Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
in coordination with a number of stakeholders, including the concerned environmentalists,
restarted the plant for a 90-day trial period to, among other things, determine the likely impact on
the wetlands.
The lessons that emerge from this section of the case study are that : (a) a government
can facilitate fair sharing of water among the partner states; (b) there is need to consider third
party interests and implement corrective measures associated with the cumulative negative
externalities of water transfers; (c) technological solutions exist but may be too expensive;
(d) in a transboundary context a poor downstream country is at the mercy of the rich and
powerful upstream country and that international sanctions can play a role in getting the
upstream countries to reduce negative impacts on downstream countries; and (e) the future
can be very unpredictable as evidenced by changes in the hydrologic regime that in turn
resulted in an under-utilization of the desalting plant and a considerable saving in operation
costs, and then led to the subsequent requirement to account for the wetlands, which were
created as a result of the desalination plant.
Water Transfers from Low- to High-value Uses: The western United States of America has a
very rich and well-documented experience in water transfers. Early water developments and
transfers were mainly for agricultural purposes. However, as the West grew, urban areas sought
a share of the water. In many basins, twentieth century agricultural and urban expansion has
eliminated water surplus, most notably in the Colorado-case described above. Because the
water resources were initially developed principally for agriculture, agriculture obtained
preferential water rights for over 90 % of the available water. In the last 3 decades, water transfer
has become a common feature of water management. For example, in all western states
permanent long-term lease (up to 35 years) and short-term lease (1 year) are common. Libecap
(2005) reported that between 1987 and 2004 the 12 western states made 2,751 transfers. Short-
term, long-term and permanent transfers accounted for 25.7 % and 68 %, while agriculture to
urban, agriculture to environment and agriculture to agriculture accounted for 55%. 6 % and350
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16 %, respectively. In volumetric terms, the transfers from agriculture to urban, agriculture to
environment and agriculture to agriculture amounted to 3.4, 3.3 and 6.8 million acre-feet (4.2,
4.1 and 8.4 billion m3), respectively. A further 11.6 million (14.3 billion m3) is classified as
miscellaneous (urban to agriculture, urban to urban, urban to environment, environment to
urban and environment to environment). These water transfers are driven mainly by market
correction of water allocation failures. Griffin and Boadu (1992) illustrated this by highlighting
the differences in what new water users were paying to acquire additional water—300-2,300
and 6,500-21,000 US$/acre-foot (243.3 to1,865.3 and 5,271.6 to 17,031.6 US$/1,000 m3) in the
Grande Valley of Texas for agricultural and urban uses, respectively (Trans-Texas Water
Program 1998). The difference between use value in agriculture and urban indicated the
significant social gain from re-allocating water from agriculture to urban. Libecap (2005) reported
that the annual mean per acre-foot prices for agriculture to urban, agriculture to agriculture
and other water trades were US$ 615,152 and 283, respectively. They also reported that the
price differences between agriculture to urban and agriculture to agriculture has rose from
US$111 in 1993 to US$1,362 in 2003.
According to Lund and Israel (1995), a series of institutional changes have facilitated
the evolution of innovative water transfer arrangements. They report that the period from
1980-2000 was marked with many changes that started with the amendments of state and
county laws to ensure that third parties, i.e., water users who are not a party to the transfer
and fish and wildlife, are shielded from the negative impacts of the transfer. Water market
and water banking are two institutional mechanisms that facilitated the efficient re-allocation
of water resources. The four main types of water markets are: (a) open water market in which
water rights are traded on a free market with no administrative control and interference; (b)
spot markets which facilitate temporary transfers of water in times of shortages; (c)
administrative water trading in which the water trade is regulated to exert some control over
the spatial, sectoral, price and equity consideration; and (d) informal water markets. A water
bank is an institution that offers to buy and sell water. It serves as an intermediary in the
water market that encourages market activities, potentially lowers transaction costs and
presents opportunities for regulating undesirable social and environmental impacts. Water
markets and water banks require strong oversight to ensure that there is good governance,
accountability and public trust. They also require clearly defined and secure water rights
and strong water resource management organizations that can monitor the use and enforce
the water rights systems.
The Colorado Big Thompson (C-BT) water project of the Northern Colorado Water
Conservation District (NCWCD) is a good example of how water transfers are managed in the
United States of America. The C-BT project has an extensive water storage and conveyance
network that delivers water to 29 cities and towns and 607,000 hectares of irrigated land. Water
is computer-controlled and an effective communication system provides real or near-real time
information to water users and system managers.
The C-BT project and its water resources are owned by the US Government. The NCWCD
is granted the perpetual right to use all the water available for recreational, irrigation and urban
uses, and is therefore, the repayment entity, the operator of facilities and distributor of the
water. These operations are overseen by the Board of Directors who have the power to make
and enforce reasonable rules and regulations for the management, control and delivery of water.
Irrigated land owners served by the project pay an annual levy on acreage under irrigation.351
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This money is used for the repayment (to the government) of the fixed cost of providing the
infrastructure and for management, operation and maintenance.
Transfers of water are subject to approval by the NCWCD Board of Directors. Irrigation
to urban transfers is routinely approved after examination of the need by the new user, for
additional water. The transfer from one tract of irrigated land to another can be approved upon
determination that the recipient land has an existing base of supply of water and that
supplemental water is needed. Transfer of ownership takes 2 to 3 months after NCWCD has
received and recorded all transactions. There are also brokers who facilitate water transfers at
a fee. To enhance transparency, regional newspapers carry information on sale and lease
opportunities (Nieuwoudt 2000). Non-profit organizations, mutual ditch companies owned by
the farmers, manage delivery of water from the NCWCD operated infrastructure to the farmers’
intakes. They facilitate market transactions by performing monitoring, distribution and
enforcement functions. Ditch companies serve as intermediaries between the NCWCD and the
irrigators.  Water lease within a ditch company can be arranged by phone. Ditch companies
compile their water orders and forward them to dispatch offices operated by the NCWCD,
which receive and process daily orders.
The main lessons learnt from this section include: (a) administrative approaches to water
allocation are gradually being replaced by market approaches that facilitate the transfer of water
from low- to high-value uses; (b) administrative water trading and water banks may be required
to facilitate the achievement of spatial, sectoral, price and equity objectives of water transfers;
(c) effective water and communication infrastructure reduce the cost of water transfer and improve
transparency, thereby enhancing public trust and confidence in the system; and (d) innovative
financing arrangement comprising government financed infrastructural development, a water fee
to facilitate government recovery of its finance, a cost sharing system in which by having water
users and water distribution companies partially finance the infrastructural costs, public
investment in water transfers can become more financially acceptable.
The Aral Sea Basin Case Study
The Aral Sea basin was formerly part of the USSR but is now made up of the five Central Asia
Republics namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The
two main rivers Amu Darya and Sry Darya rise from the mountainous countries (Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan) and flow northwestwardly through the arid plains and desert areas of Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan (Amu Darya River) and of Kazakhstan (Syr Darya River) and eventually flow
into the Aral Sea. During the Soviet Era, 39 major reservoirs were constructed to regulate flows,
generate hydropower and facilitate irrigation diversions.
The High Cost of Ignoring Negative Externalities:
Water transfers in the Aral Sea basin were mainly driven by the potential economic gains from
hydropower and irrigated agriculture. During the period 1960 to 1987, the irrigated area rose
from 4.5 to 8.0 million hectares and the annual irrigation diversion increased from 60 to 105 km3
leaving less than 10 % of the natural runoff to flow into the Aral Sea (McKinney 2003).
Consequently, the Aral Sea’s water level dropped by 13 m and the surface area and volume
decreased by 60 % and 70 %, respectively (Micklin 1988). Reduced water inflow, surface area
and volume resulted in desiccation of 40 % of the wetland area, disappearance of 24 native352
F. Gichuki and P. G. McCornick
fish species, collapse of the fishing industry and the loss of livelihoods for millions of people.
Inadequate drainage in the irrigation schemes contributed to waterlogging and salinization
problems in approximately 5 million hectares of irrigated land.
From this section of the case study we note that the environmental disaster, which
followed from the original large-scale intra-basin transfer (from the environment to agriculture
and hydropower) was enormous, and while the benefits of the irrigated cotton and wheat, and
the hydropower were also significant, these negative impacts have been at an unprecedented
scale. Inter-basin water transfers did not yield a high total basin wide benefit, but rather an
increase in one part at the expense of another. The situation is further compounded by the
fact that, unlike in the Colorado Basin case study where sufficient resources were deployed to
implement mitigation measures, these cash strapped economies could not mitigate the problems.
Hence, the need to critically assess environmental flow requirements and to secure these flows,
particularly where many people depend on the livelihoods from such ecosystems.
From Imposed to Negotiated Cooperation of Riparian States:
Under the ‘Soviet Era’, water allocations and transfers were planned centrally resulting in some
form of imposed cooperation among the riparian states. The three key features of this
cooperation were:  (a) water allocation among the five states—the mountainous republics
(Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) could only utilize 25 % of surface and groundwater originating in
its territory and had to pass on 75 % of the resource downstream; (b) oil producing downstream
republics provided upstream republics with free oil to produce energy for winter heating so
that they could secure summer flows to sustain irrigation development; and (c) upstream
reservoirs were operated in a way that optimized downstream irrigation during the summer
growing season rather than hydropower during the winter, and provided storage for drought
security. The high potential for irrigating cotton production was the major justification for water
transfers and economic cooperation (IWMI 2006).
After the break up of the USSR, new independent republics were created. With no binding
interstate legal framework, some of the cooperative arrangements came under pressure as each
newly independent country sought to meet their national level needs. Competition for irrigation
water between the arid regions of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan intensified, and Kyrgyzstan
changed its water reservoir operating policy. It released 61-67 % higher flows in winter and
68 –77 % less in the summer from the Tokhtogul Reservoir than it did during the Soviet era
(IWMI 2006). While the increase in winter flows mean the water can no longer be used in
irrigation, the formation of an ice jam in the middle reaches of the Syr Darya means that the
flows do not reach the Aral Sea, rather a large portion of the winter water release is now
transferred to what is ostensibly a sink – Lake Arnasia.
Attempts to have the countries cooperate around this issue essentially failed, demonstrating
that in this case, water transfers did not support broader regional cooperation. But later, according
to UNDP, World Bank and Bank Netherlands Water Partnership Program (2003), an Interstate
Agreement was signed in 1992 to guide the negotiated cooperation that is needed to re-establish
trust and confidence, and facilitate effective management, utilization, and protection of water
resources in the Aral Sea basin, and implement joint measures to address the Aral Sea problem.
Numerous problems have been encountered during the implementation of these agreements.353
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This section of the case study highlights (a) the downside of water transfers if the enabling
conditions unravel, especially for such a large scale; and (b) the growing recognition of the
critical role that cooperation among riparian states can play as an innovative institutional
instrument for facilitating faster regional development through co-development, cost and benefit
sharing and a shift of focus from water sharing to benefit sharing as a way to redress past
inequity in water sharing.
Inter-basin Water Transfer in Spain—Tagus-Segura-Ebro Basins Case Study
The general perception is that it is the government’s responsibility to correct the natural
hydrologic imbalance, particularly where such imbalance is the main constraint to socioeconomic
development of water-scarce areas. In this case study we examine the critical role played by
the Government of Spain.
Agriculture is the main economic sector in the Segura Basin, but its performance is
constrained by scarcity and variability of both ground and surface water resources. In the 1930s,
irrigation expansion plans called for the development of local surface and groundwater and
transferring water from the Tagus and Ebro basins. In the 1940s, two dozen reservoirs were
constructed with a combined capacity of 1,000 Mm3 in the Segura Basin and in the 1950s and
1960s; the Government of Spain implemented a program that supported groundwater irrigation.
In 1979, the Tagus-Segura water transfer project with a design capacity of 100 Mm3
year-1 became operational, but only delivered on average 30 Mm3 year-1 due to there being
less water available in the Tagus Basin than estimated. However, irrigation continued to
expand with the private and unregulated development of groundwater, which in turn led to
overexploitation of groundwater aquifers. The government responded to the groundwater
overexploitation challenge by the passage of the 1985 Water Law, which set a cap on the
number of wells and their discharge. The law was not adequately enforced and groundwater
overdraft continued. The irrigated area, which increased from 90,000 to 115,000 ha between
1933 and 1963, jumped to 197,000 by 1983 mainly because of Tagus water transfer in 1979.
And by the year 2000, the irrigated area had increased to 252,000 hectares.
In 2001, the Spanish Parliament enacted the Law of the National Water Plan8 in which
1,050 Mm3 year-1 was to be transferred from the Ebro River, of which 50 % was to be used to
reduce water stress in parts of the Segura Basin that were experiencing groundwater overdraft.
The Ebro water transfer was strongly opposed by (a) the Government of the Aragon
autonomous region located in the Ebro Basin; (b) the people of Ebro delta region; and
(c) many environmental groups, scholars and members of civil society. Massive demonstrations
8 The Law of the National Water Plan has several articles that  guard against the misuse of the water
to be transferred. They include: (a) Article 18 which states that not a single drop of the Ebro River can
go to an overexploited aquifer if detailed studies of the situation are not previously performed and
approved by the Central Government; (b) Article 29 established the need to carry out comprehensive
groundwater studies and to foster the formation of groundwater user groups to spur small-scale
hydrosolidarity; and (c) Article 34 seeks to promote good water management and ethics through edu-
cational campaigns (Llamas and Perez-Picazo 2001).354
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against the project took place9, as those opposed to the water transfer perceived it as a project
that threatened livelihoods and ecosystems, ignored environmental directives and mocked the
idea of spending public money responsibly. According to Llamas and Perez-Picazo (2001), a
poll on the social perception of the Ebro water transfer showed that 50 % of the respondents
were in favor of the project and 30 % against. Those in favour were mainly influenced by the
common belief in every culture or religion that water should be given to the thirsty. Those
against were more influenced by their perception that Segura had more water than it needed
if only it could use it more efficiently and productively. Several studies have shown that water
demand management would for the time being be a better option to addressing the problems
of the Segura Basin than transferring water from Ebro Basin.10
The case of the Tagus-Segura-Ebro basins presents facets that appear particularly
relevant to the Indian context.  The original water transfer, while it seems to have been relatively
successful, was seriously compromised by a significant overestimation of the available water,
which, among other things, affects the credibility of future efforts to develop transfers. The
prevailing financial and market conditions made it attractive for farmers to expand irrigated
areas using groundwater.  Efforts to regulate groundwater use failed, and a project aimed at
providing an alternative water source for the irrigated area and other users within the receiving
basin was effectively blocked by the stakeholders in the proposed donor basin, despite a
general perception that the project was appropriate.
Long Distance Inter-basin Water Transfer—China’s South-to-North Transfer
China’s unprecedented economic growth combined with its high population and water scarcity
has resulted in increased calls for water transfers from the water surplus southern to the
water-scarce northern basins. Feasibility studies on the South-to-North water transfers started
9 For 3 years, thousands of people participated in massive demonstrations. They raised awareness of
the negative impacts of water transfers and mobilized support to stop the transfer. They used a wide
range of approaches that included: candlelit procession, people chaining themselves outside govern-
ment offices, holding public meetings, using attention grabbing leaflets, graffiti, concerts,
fiestas, puppets and organizing competitions. They mobilized activists from all social strata
(category). Fifteen thousand protestors went to Brussels to demonstrate in favor of EU legislation and
against their country receiving EU funds (Starbridge 2005).
10 Albiac (2002) examined water demand management in the Segura Basin as an alternative to water
transfer from the Ebro Basin. He considers two water demand management instruments–1) restriction
on groundwater use; and 2) increase in water price. He reported that (a) the transferred water would
have higher costs, 0.19-0.75 Euro/m3 higher than current costs and, hence would only be economic for
high-value crops; (b) the Segura Basin would only be able to absorb 2.2 Mm3 of the water destined for
agricultural use at the water transfer price and not the 3.62 Mm3 designated in the National Hydrologic
Plan to achieve sustainable groundwater management; and (c) subsidy of transferred water would be
feasible, but very expensive to the non-agricultural users in Segura. He, therefore, argued that demand
management strategy would be preferable, because it guarantees the relief of pressure on aquifers com-
ing from agricultural use without needing to establish strict controls on wells.355
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in the 1950s and identified three major water transfers (the western,11 central12 and eastern13
route) projects. Environmental impact assessments of the Eastern and Central Route water
transfer projects were completed and the projects approved for construction (Shao et al. 2003).
Overcoming Technical Challenges:
Many studies were carried out to identify and address the technical challenges associated
with the long-distance of the eastern and central route water transfers. We highlight a few
studies to illustrate the technical complexities and technical solutions.
Shao et al. (2003) presented a review of structural problems associated with slope stability,
seepage loss and groundwater rise, the settlement of ground surface in the coal mining area,
freezing and thawing of the soil and liquefaction of sand in the central route. Mitigation
measures were identified and implemented.14
Environmental and health hazards were also carefully assessed and addressed. Yin et al.
2001 (quoted by Shao et al. 2003) reported that the diversion from the Hanjiang River into the
middle route worsened the eutrophication problem downstream of the diversion point. Sufficient
solar radiation during the spring season combined with  higher nitrogen/phosphorous loading,
low discharge (<500 m3 s-1), slow velocity (<0.8 m3 s-1) and high water temperature (10.5-12.80C)
led to high algae bloom that was recorded in the lower reaches of the Hanjiang River in 1992,
1998 and 2000. Li et al. (2000 quoted in Shao et al. 2003) raised concerns over the possible
proliferation of parasitic diseases. They reported that during the period 1989-1998, a total of
7,772 cases of acute schistosomiasis infection were reported in the Hubei Province. Huang et
al, .2000 (quoted in Shao et al. 2003) reported that the total area of snail habitat in the Jiangsu
Province was 162 km2, and that inter-basin water transfers can lead to the development of
11 The Western Route diverts water from three major tributaries of the Yangtze River to the Yellow
River.
12 The middle or central route diverts water from the Danjiangkou Reservoir on the Hanjiang River to
the Yellow River.
13 The Eastern Route diverts water from the Yangtze River, stores it in four natural lakes and several
planned reservoirs and uses a siphon to cross the Yellow River.
14 Slope stability problem was expected along 160 km (12%) of the transfer channel. Slope stabiliza-
tion was achieved using a combination of countermeasures that included: smaller slope angle, vegetated
canal banks, drainage ditches, grouting, anchoring and masonry protection. As the transfer canal passes
through seven coalmine areas (51 km), surface subsidence, collapse and ground fissures on these areas
were anticipated where the effects of coal mining and canal seepage combined. This problem was solved
by either re-routing the canal to avoid such a combination or by providing artificial cushion foundation
that reduced seepage and soil deformation. Liquefaction and collapse could also occur under seismic
shocks if the canal is built on such silty sand base. Preventive measures for this problem included
drainage, canal leak proofing, masonry protection, chemical grouting and in some cases deep foundation
and anti-earthquake provisions. The presence of water is the main cause of frost heaving and its
destructive effect, and consequently drainage and seepage prevention were complementary measures to
reinforce the concrete lining of the canal.356
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snail habitats in the recipient basin. However, as snails cannot survive in the extreme cold
climate, the spread of snail habitat north of Biama Lake in Jiangsu Province (above latitude 330
15’) would be limited.
Analysis of the combined effect of the South-North water transfer and the Three Gorges
Project showed that the operation of the two projects together will lead to a slightly longer
time and distance of saltwater encroachment up the Yangtze River mouth, during the months
of October, November and December (Wu and Wang 2002 quoted in Shao et al. 2003). The
operation of the Three-Gorges Dam, the South to North water transfer and the deepwater
navigation channel at Shanghai is expected to result in a 10-20 % decrease in sediment discharge
into the Yangtze River delta. This may degrade the delta ecosystem with implications on the
required level of coastal protection for Shanghai.
This section of the case study illustrates the technical complexities associated with long-
distance water transfers and the need to take a holistic view. By combining the effects of water
transfers with those of the Three-Gorges Dam, they were able to assess the cumulative effect.
It also illustrates that generally there are technical solutions; the problem may be getting the
resources to implement them.
Innovative Co-financing Arrangements:
In 1999 there was a shift in China’s water policy from structural measures to integrated and
holistic approaches (Boxer 2001). This was followed in 2002 by the institutionalization of water
rights and water markets. The law provides a framework for promoting sustainable water
management through appropriate water rights and licensing systems, river basin management
approaches, progressive water pricing and a penalty price for water use that exceeds the
allocated quota.
Securing funding for such a massive water transfer project was a major challenge that
was further complicated by (a) the fact that water would be transferred from one province to
another and in some cases through other provinces; (b) disagreements attributed to the fact
that all provinces have their own administrative powers and economic interest; and (c) the
fact that water infrastructure is considered to be part of the national infrastructure, and provinces
were not keen to finance national infrastructure. An innovative co-financing arrangement was
formulated in which (a) the construction of the back-bone infrastructure of the South-to-North
transfer is financed through the establishment of a construction fund to cover construction,
interest and maintenance costs, which is shared by each province in the form of purchasing
water rights (Wang 2001 quoted in Shao et al.. 2003); and (b) each province could raise funds
by charging individual users for their water use.
In this section of the case study we note that, just as in the United States of America
case study, the water policy reform towards water pricing, water markets and co-financing
are creating the appropriate enabling environment. Innovative co-financing arrangements
can avail additional resources needed for massive projects; can increase the level of
participation, transparency and good governance; and can lower implementation cost,
thereby making water transfers more cost-effective. Also, when water users know that they
will end up paying for the water transferred they are more likely to fully exploit opportunities
for the better management of existing water resources before demanding additional water
resources through water transfer schemes.357
International Experiences of Water Tranfers: Relevance to India
Transboundary Water Transfer—Lesotho Highland Water Project Case Study
India has less powerful but water-rich upstream neighbors – Bhutan and Nepal. They present
opportunities for the co-development of water resources for the benefit of all parties. We
examined the Lesotho Highland Water Project for lessons on how upstream and downstream
countries can enhance basin-wide benefits through water, cost and benefit sharing mechanisms.
Politics Can Be a Major Stumbling Block:
Lesotho is a land-locked poor country surrounded by South Africa, but it is strategically located
in the Drakensberg Mountains, a major water tower for South Africa. South Africa recognized
this potential and carried out a reconnaissance study in 1956. This opportunity was revisited
by the Government of South Africa following the catastrophic droughts of the mid-1960s. In
1968, South Africa and Lesotho reached an agreement in principle and started consultations,
but the negotiation broke off in the 1970s over royalty payment issues. Lesotho Government’s
support to the black South African struggle for independence strained the relationship between
the two countries, and the talks were suspended in 1976. Low-level consultations resumed in
1980 and paved the way for feasibility studies. It was not until the 1986 regime change in
Lesotho by a military coup d’etat that the negotiations were concluded. The two conditions
that facilitated successful water transfer from Lesotho to South Africa were: (a) the treaty (signed
in 1986) that clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of the two states, the strategies for
preventing and settling disputes, and facilitated the setting up of governance structures that
symbolized cooperation and overcome mistrust; and (b) adequate direct and in-direct benefits
that motivated the states’ commitment (Mirumachi 2004).
Corruption Can Mar Good Intentions:
The construction of Phase 1A of the project was undertaken between 1989 and 1998 and facilitated
the transfer of 0.5 km3 of water per year from the Orange River to the Vaal River for use in South
Africa’s industrial province of Gauteng. Phase1B was started and upon completion increased
the transfer rate from 18 to 30 m3 s -1. The project infrastructure affected over 30,000 people,
displaced 325 households and led to an ex-closure of 2,300 and 3,400 hectares of crop and grazing
land, respectively. The annual royalties that Lesotho receives are estimated to be over US$80
million and accounts for approximately 28 % of the total government revenue (WWF 2007).
The project was expected to cost US$4 billion but ended up costing US$8 billion.
Corruption was largely blamed for the escalating costs. In an analysis of what went wrong,
Hildyard (2000), highlighted the need to consider the possibility that what went most ‘wrong’
from the perspective of project-affected people, human rights groups, environmentalists and
a range of other civil society groups concerned with accountability, transparency, equity and
sustainable development is precisely what went most ‘right’ from the perspective of those
who have benefited institutionally and financially from the project. He argued that taking this
approach challenges us to focus less on the perceived ‘lack of political will’ to tackle corruption
and instead focus more on those vested interests that generate immense political will to block
investigations when they are initiated and to undermine anti-corruption drives. This will facilitate
the analysis of how regulations could be improved and how institutional practices can be358
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changed and empowered to effectively implement anti-corruption regulations. He concluded
that (a) the problem of corruption is unlikely to be addressed by new regulations unless and
until the well-documented structural and institutional barriers to their rigorous implementation
are addressed; (b) addressing institutional and structural barriers requires a major overhaul of
the mission, management and culture of institutions, which act so consistently to the detriment
of openness, accountability and democratic decision-making processes; and (c) such radical
change is unlikely to come about through the goodwill of the institutions under scrutiny and,
hence public pressure is a prerequisite for change. These findings are significant not just for
India but for all situations where corruption is expected to adversely affect perception over
the effectiveness of government investment in such projects.
Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating Environmental Impacts:
The treaty between South Africa and Lesotho included specific environmental conservation
and compensation requirements. However, the project started without an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA). Nevertheless, a full EIA with a proper environmental flow analysis (including
examination of the physical, chemical and biological characteristics, and modeling of water
quality) was carried out for phase 1B. The EIA raised concerns over critically endangered Maloti
minnow, threatened habitats, reduced volume of water for effective dilution of pollutants in
the lower reaches of the Orange River and risk of increased de-oxygenation and eutrophication.
The utility of the environmental flow assessment was criticised for:
(a) lack of legal framework for implementing recommendations; (b) inadequate involvement of
the key stakeholders and profession disciplines; and (c) lack of criteria for judging what level
of environmental degradation might be considered acceptable by both parties (Watson 2006).
Environmental impacts assessment should, therefore, be integrated into various stages of
project planning and any concerns addressed by a multidisciplinary and multi-level group of
stakeholders, so as to fully incorporate any environmental, social, cultural, economic, legal
and political consideration.
Inter-basin Water Transfer—Sao Francisco Interlinking Project, Brazil
Brazil is generally considered to be a water-rich country, but its northern-east region is water-
scarce and experiences frequent droughts. The rationale for planning Sao Francisco water
transfers is the belief that transferring water from water abundant to water-scarce areas is in
the national interest of enhancing socioeconomic development and reducing regional inequity.
However, as this case study illustrates, getting a consensus on how to achieve the noble
goals of equitable socioeconomic development remains elusive.
The semi-arid areas of north-eastern Brazil are drought prone. According to the International
Research Institute for Climate and Society (2005) the area has experienced
28 severe drought years between 1900 and 1999. The effects of many of these droughts are felt
for 3-4 years. Drought-proofing the region by transferring water to this region has, therefore,
been under consideration for a long time. In 1981, the National Department of Reclamation Works
(DNOS) carried out feasibility studies. These formed the basis for the request by the Government
of Brazil for the World Bank to finance the preparation of an action plan for the Sao Francisco359
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Transbasin Project. According to Simpson (1999), the proposed action plan recommended:
(a) the full development of local and state water-related institutional capacity before the
construction of the Sao Francisco diversion works; (b) establishment of irrigation pilot areas in
the plateau of Jaguaribe in Ceará and Apodi in Rio Grande do Norte; (c) establishment of a multi-
sectoral entity to develop detailed plans and implement the project; and (d) the requirement that
institutional constraints to efficient water use at both the state and federal levels be resolved
prior to the project implementation study. In 1989, CODEVASF (Companhia do Desenvolvimento
dos Vales do São Francisco) prepared a comprehensive basin plan after a detailed assessment of
the needs and potential for development and commercialization of agriculture, hydropower, water
supply and wastewater treatment. In 1995, the states of the north-east in cooperation with the
National Secretariat of Water Resources formed a group representing water resources sectors of
all states to foster water resources legal and institutional cooperation.
In 2000, the government revived planning of the Sao Francisco Interlinking Project. The
project aims at enhancing water supply to the over 12 million people and irrigate over 300,000
hectares in the semi-arid region of Pernambuco Agreste and the Metropolitan area of Fortaleza
in north-east Brazil. Approximately 99 m3/s of water was to be transferred from the Sao Francisco
River to Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte and Paraiba states that are outside the basin, and a further
28 m3/s of inter-basin transfer to the Pernambuco states. The project is estimated to cost at
least US$2.38 billion and generate jobs for up to 1 million people.
According to Tortajada (2006), the proposed water transfer has the following innovative
ideas: (a) the water transferred will be paid for by the receiving state or irrigators; (b) full cost
recovery principle will be applied to promote the efficient use of irrigation water; (c) charges
for drinking water will be lower corresponding to the so called social rate for the rural
population; (d) the volume of irrigation water delivered will depend on the implementation of
demand management practices and water-saving technology adopted by the farmers; and
(e) negative impacts of water transfers will be reduced. The government has also addressed
emerging concerns. Existing water uses are secured and so are the water requirements for energy
up to 2025.
Despite all the above assurances and the fact that the project was approved by National
Water Resources Council acting on behalf of the Federal Government in February 2006, the
construction has been delayed due to (a) the delay in approval by the river basin committee
that publicly expressed concerns over the proposed approach and the process followed thus
far; (b) the government’s decision to shelve the project until after the elections; and (c) concerns
raised by various lobby groups such as the use of unrealistic costs and benefits.
Analysis of Case Studies
In this section we analyze the experience of the six case studies and discern lessons that can
guide planning, implementation, operation and maintenance of future water transfer projects.
We capture issues associated with long distance transfers (China and Aral sea case studies),
transboundary inter-basin transfers (Lesotho-South Africa and Aral Sea case studies); inter-
basin transfers in a federal government set up (China and Brazil case studies) and within water
project and intra-basin transfers (USA case study).360
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What Are Some of the Impacts?
Hydrologic, Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts
The literature espousing the hydrologic, environmental and socioeconomic impacts of water
transfers is vast (ICID 2006; Das 2006; Gibbins et al. 2000; Snaddon and Davis 1998; and Howe
and Goemans 2003), and the case studies highlight the nature and extent of these impacts. In
this section we analyze the extent to which the impacts and mitigation measures are identified
and adequately assessed.
The impacts can be positive or negative, and their nature and extent varies widely
depending on the type and characteristics of water transfer and on other biophysical and
socioeconomic conditions (see Table 1). The impacts affect different stakeholders in different
locations and in different ways, and have a high temporal variability. And yet, in most cases
impacts are presented in a summarized and condensed manner, giving the impression that the
impacts are the same everywhere and all the time. Generally, the direct and indirect effect of
water transfers on livelihoods;15 food security;16 poverty alleviation;17 health mortality, morbidity
15 Such as changes in production, employment, processing and trade related incomes.
16 Such as changes in regional or household food production and market prices.
17 In terms of number of people who are better or worse off and change in income of the poor.
Table 1. Impact categories and effects of water transfers.
Impact category Effects of water transfer
Hydrologic Volume, rate and timing of surface flow
Seepage transmission losses
Evapotranspiration from water bodies
Groundwater recharge and discharge
Areas of freshwater ecosystems
Channel erosion and siltation
Environmental Reservoir induced seismicity
Water quality (physical, biological and chemical pollutants)
Soil salinization
Waterlogging
Desiccation and loss of connectivity of freshwater ecosystems
Habitat status
Transfers of alien and invasive flora and fauna
Invertebrates diversity and quantity
Fish diversity and population
Disease vectors
Socioeconomic Changes in value/reliability of benefits derived from in- and off-stream water uses
Changes in costs/vulnerability associated with in- and off-stream water uses
Displacement and resettlement costs and benefits
Costs associated with conflict management
Benefits associated with cooperation
Multiplier effect of direct benefits arising from water transfer
Opportunity cost of investment in water transfer361
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and health risks; and access and quality of regulating, supporting and cultural services derived
from freshwater ecosystems prior to the implementation of the transfer are poorly documented.
Third party18 impacts resulting mainly from loss of farm-related jobs and market opportunities
for the goods and services are also inadequately documented. This is partly attributed to the
fact that indirect impacts are more difficult to quantify, that they are believed to be minimal
and that they are assumed to be naturally mitigated as if the economy is able to self-adjust to
create opportunities for those who lose. In other cases the problem may be the ineffectual
implementation of mitigation measures.
Impacts on Agricultural Production, Food Security and Poverty
Available literature highlights the complex inter-relationships that determine the nature and
extent of both positive and negative impacts and the difficulty in fully identifying the conditions
that determine the direction, nature and extent of these impacts. The cause-effect is sometimes
difficult to establish, and in some cases, the impacts have been mainly attributed to the broader
effects of dynamic changes in the rural and urban economies, such as the declining
competitiveness of agriculture in the area (Rosegrant and Ringler 1999).
Transferring water from agriculture can impact a wide range of stakeholders, depending
on how dependent they are on the agricultural economy. Transfers can result in changes in
the cropping pattern, irrigated area, intensity and productivity. Whereas the recipient and donor
of the water may gain through their transactions, other parties may be negatively affected
through the reduced water availability and quality. For example, (a) water transfer from rural to
urban areas could lower farm employment and demand for rural services and increase them in
urban areas; (b) reducing water use in agriculture might positively benefit by improving water
quantity and quality downstream to the benefit of fish and other downstream water users;
while reducing irrigation drainage outflow might harm flora and fauna dependent on habitats
sustained by irrigation return flows. These changes can affect employment opportunities,
agricultural incomes, local food self-sufficiency, associated business activities and local and
central government revenue. The severity of economic impacts will differ depending on: (a)
whether there is adequate economic integration between the source and recipient regions; (b)
whether the water donors are compensated or the proceeds from the transfers are invested in
the area of origin; (c) economic vitality of the water sources areas; and (d) other spin-off
benefits that arise from the transfers.
18 Potential third parties to water transfers include: general taxpayers; urban – (downstream urban uses;
the poor urban crop, fish and livestock producers; those employed by companies that would be af-
fected by the transfers); rural (irrigators, fishers and their employees; rural water supply organizations
and their employees); and environmental (fish and wildlife habitat and those affected by potential land
subsidence, overdraft, water quality deterioration and well interference).362
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Zhang and Zhang (1995) estimated that in the Yellow River basin, 3 billion cubic meters
of urban and industrial wastewater per year has polluted 60 % of its drinking water.   Rosegrant
and Ringler (1999) reported that in the suburbs of Beijing, both grain output and overall
agriculture output value continued to increase at the same time that water had been diverted
to urban uses, which resulted a decline in the overall irrigated area.
Where water is being transferred to high-value uses and the water donors are
compensated fairly, water transfer has resulted in increases in water productivity and
agricultural incomes. In California, Dixon et al. (1993) reported that farmers who transferred
some of their water to other uses reduced their operating cost by 11 % and crop sales by
20 %. These reductions adversely affected the suppliers of farm inputs, agricultural workers.
Villarejo (1997) in a study on the impact of drought-related water transfers from agriculture
to urban areas in Mendota, California reported a 30 %, 14 %, 26 % and 14 % decline in
agricultural land value, irrigated area, the number of farms and labor income, respectively.
Increased use of low-quality groundwater to compensate for the water transfer to urban
areas resulted in a 37 % and 5 % decline in the yield of water melons and staple crops,
respectively. Similarly, in the Jordan Valley, the transfer of freshwater to the urban areas and
subsequent relatively unplanned transfers that replaced freshwater with reclaimed water has
constrained the crops that can be grown in the Middle Valley.  For example, stone fruits and
vines are susceptible to the relatively high levels of chloride (McCornick, Grattan, and Abu-
Eisheh 2003).  Those farmers receiving reclaimed water pay half the service fees of those
with access to freshwater.  A study on the effect of the transfer of 10 % of agricultural water
to urban use in San Diego, California reported that the worst case would reduce water for
some by as much as 25 %. Such a reduction in water availability would result in a personal
income reduction of 5 %, and an increase in average unemployment of the counties of
1.3 %, and in farm employment of 3.9 %.
What Facilitates or Constraints Water Transfers?
The determinants of a water transfer can be grouped into three categories: (a) the natural and
human factors that influence the quantity demanded and available supply; (b) the willingness
and ability of the water donors and recipients to negotiate and implement the transfer; and (c)
external factors that influence the water transfer institutions.
Water Demand and Supply
Water transfer is a response to the growing mismatch between water demand and supply. The
water may be transferred to reduce flood damage to a downstream location, but it is generally
transferred because there is a water deficit area that can benefit from the excess water available
elsewhere. Human needs, how the needs are met and how the available water is managed
combine with natural factors to determine water demand and supply. In general, increasing
water demand associated with export and local consumption of agricultural produce in a water
deficit area increases the demand for water transfer. For example, in the Spain case study, the
flourishing agriculture produce export and local trade in the Segura Basin was the main driver
of irrigation water requirements and groundwater overdraft.363
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Willingness and Ability of Water Donors and Recipients to Implement
the Transfers
The willingness and ability of water donors to engage in a water transfer scheme depend on
the availability of surplus water and the rationale for sharing and exporting water to the water
recipients. The easiest water to transfer is the surplus water (renewable water resource less
the sum of what is currently and likely to be used in the future and what is required to flow to
the river outlet and satisfy other environmental requirements). However, regions/basins with
large quantities of excess water are few. Canada, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo and
Nepal are among the few countries with huge quantities of surplus water. In most other cases,
for example, the Mekong Basin, where excess water is available only during the rainy season
and huge storage capacities may be required to even the flow. In other cases, the surplus
water is not so huge, but opportunities for augmenting it exist through some form of water
saving practices, although this is becoming less viable as basin level efficiencies are already
relatively high in many basins in the arid and semi-arid parts of the world. The water donors
participate in water transfer because of: (a) the direct economic gain as in the case of Lesotho;
and (b) indirect gains as part of a grand plan for regional cooperation as in the case of Egypt
and Turkey’s willingness to transfer water to the Middle East (Dinar and Wolf 1997; Tesfaye
2001), driven by interests beyond the immediate region.
The recipient basin/region will be willing to participate in the water supply if the perceived
future benefits are high and the costs of importing water is much less than the cost of water
demand management. This is particularly so in the case of transboundary water transfers (see
Lesotho case study), but in the case of national water transfers the government may be willing
to subsidize the project as in the case of China, Spain, Brazil and the United States, and is
effectively a major driver for developing the transfer. We note that while it may be easier to
implement a transfer with a strong federal government presence, the long-term sustainability
may be more assured with a strong state involvement.
High transaction costs and risks are the two main factors that can dissuade potential
partners in water transfer. Transaction costs may include: legal fees; costs of public agency
review; costs of required technical studies; and costs involved in settling claims from third
parties. Risks may be related to climatic changes, to unilateral actions of water donors that
might reduce the amount of water available for transfer, and to structural failure, particularly
for long distance water transfers.
External Factors that Influence the Water Transfer Institutions
The main external drivers that we consider are associated with government and lobby groups.
In the case of within national water transfer, the level of government commitment and financial
support is a major driver as evidenced in the Brazil, China and Spain case studies. In all case
studies, federal, state and local governments play a critical role in creating enabling conditions
that improve the prospects for water transfers by: (a) improving information and facilitating
consultations and negotiations regarding transfers and transfer impacts; (b) ensuring that there
is a credible process for managing third party impacts; (c) reducing the transaction costs
associated with water transfers; (d) increasing the probability that acceptable water transfer364
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will be successful; and (e) securing funds for the transfers. In most cases these conditions
may not be met, leading to sub-optimal performances.
Environmental and civil society lobby groups have also played a key role, particularly
in highlighting the negative social and environmental impacts and the need to consider other
alternatives to water transfers. Their role is particularly conspicuous in the Brazil and Spain
case studies where they challenged the credibility of the costs and benefits of the proposed
water transferred, and argued that there were cheaper alternatives in which the government
resources could be invested to achieve the same goal but had not been considered.
What Institutional Arrangements Facilitate Transfers Best?
There is growing evidence that water transfer will continue to take place (Tumbare 2001; Davis
et al. 1993, ICID 2006). The key question is what institutional arrangement will be required to
facilitate the development of environmentally, socially, economically and politically acceptable
water transfers. The case studies illustrate that changes in policy, legal and organizational
frameworks are needed to: (a) defer water transfers where water demand management options
are more economical; (b) secure water rights and facilitate their effective transfers so as to
reduce risks and protect the rights of the poor and the environment; (c) protect third parties
from the negative impacts of water transfers; (d) facilitate effective consultations and
negotiations; and (e) provide incentives for lending agencies and the private sector to participate
in water transfers. The precise nature of reform and instruments to be deployed will vary from
area to area depending on the relative water scarcity, level of agricultural intensification, nature
and extent of negative impacts, level of economic development and organizational capabilities.
Several countries have explicitly incorporated water transfer clauses in their water act
and policy.  South Africa is a good example. Their water policy states that:  “Inter-basin transfers
will have to meet special planning requirements and implementation procedures, which must
involve agencies from both donor and recipient catchments. Catchments to which water will
be transferred will have to show that the water currently available in that catchment is being
optimally used and that reasonable measures to conserve water are in force.” This policy
change has influenced the development of water transfer schemes by ensuring that water
demand management approaches forestall water transfers and allow available funds for
infrastructure investment to be focused on priority areas for service expansion (UNDESA 2005).
At a transboundary level, water transfer should be seen as part of a broader cooperative
agreement. In southern Africa, the regional cooperation has created the enabling conditions
for consultation and negotiations on water transfers by: (a) having a broader technical,
commercial, political cooperation which helps in building mutual trust; (b) having negotiators
who can be trusted; and (c) by having a framework for information sharing and research. Given
that each basin state is entitled to an equitable and beneficial share of the water and the need
to manage it sustainably, river basin institutions should promote understanding and mutual
trust between the parties. The parties must: (a) establish potentials and alternative strategies
for achieving those potentials; (b) discuss mutual expectations and fears; and (c) negotiate
on the most desirable strategies. Long- and short-term river basin plans are needed to
adequately define feasible options and prepare the stakeholders to raise their concerns and
ensure that they are incorporated in the next basin plans. This can contribute to developing365
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a shared vision and also in opening other opportunities for cooperation such as trade.  Such
plans can form the basis for improving cooperation (Saddoff and Grey 2005).
What Principles, Approaches and Processes Should Guide Planning?
Successful water transfer schemes are generally considered to be environmentally, economically,
socially and politically acceptable. By using accepted principles, correct approaches and
effective processes you ensure that major economic, ecological, social, cultural and political
issues are adequately addressed.
Water transfer planning should be guided by acceptable hydrologic, ecological, economic
and social principles. Most of these are already an integral part of water resources planning
and management. The case studies illustrate the need to take into consideration all the
principles and, specifically, the solidarity19 and precautionary20 principles.
Many water transfer projects have been criticized for failing to take a holistic approach
to problem, opportunities and solution analysis. For example, the Brazil case study illustrates
a failure to explore other options to achieve the desired socioeconomic development and only
focus on water transfer as the main driver of economic development. In the Spain case study,
it was argued that water-demand management would be more cost-effective than augmenting
water by water transfers. In the case of the Aral Sea water transfer, some of the contentions
revolved around the reservoir operating policy and its effect on the benefits derived from
hydropower and irrigation and as to who received the benefits. We, therefore, argue that using
the correct approaches will improve the changes in planning acceptable water transfers.
Water transfers generally take a long time to accomplish. The processes followed in the
pre-feasibility, feasibility, design, implementation and operation and maintenance should ensure
continuity, and have an inbuilt flexibility to take into consideration new insights, data and
analytical tools. The processes followed should take into consideration the fact that water transfers
issues are shaped by the context, information, assessment, consultation and negotiation. Regular
and well-structured debates should be part of the processes that help clarify and agree on the
vision, goals, targets, problems and opportunities, possible interventions, criteria to be used in
selecting the most appropriate interventions and the required monitoring, evaluation and adaptive
management. We surmise that most water transfer controversies can be resolved by using the
right process, at the right time and within the right context. Such idealistic conditions can only
be achieved through a gradual process of adaptive management.
19 Principle of solidarity – Solidarity of those who have the resource and give it up to those who lack
it, thereby contributing to the creation of employment and wealth creation for the country/region that
is beneficial for all.
20 The Precautionary Principle is also reflected in Principle 15 of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED): it states that ‘Where there are threats of serious or irrevers-
ible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation.366
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How Can Research Contribute?
Water transfer controversies are generally fuelled by lack of a good understanding of the
complex system, and how water transfer will impact people and the ecosystems they depend
on. The primary responsibility of research is to improve stakeholders’ understanding of the
economic, ecological, social, cultural and political issues associated with water transfers, and
present feasible solutions to the problems that may emerge. Other important contributions are
developing tools and methods for generating and applying information on contentious issues
such as: (a) dispelling the myths; (b) risk and uncertainty associated with human behavior,
politics and climate change; and (c) water and water-related benefit sharing. In practice, this is
not happening, partly due to the disconnection between researchers and those involved in
planning and implementing water transfer projects.
Conclusions and Lessons for the NRLP
Conclusions
The case studies illustrate the fact that the water transfer context changes. First, changing
political, governance and trade contexts create opportunities and challenges for shifts from
unilateral to cooperative actions. The shift from water sharing to hydro-solidarity, best joint
utilization and benefit sharing is also providing additional impetus for cooperative actions.
Under cooperative action, water transfer schemes are more acceptable in keeping with the
solidarity and benefit sharing concepts. Second, land use intensification (in situ moisture
conservation, runoff control, small dams) is increasing evapotranspiration and groundwater
recharge resulting in unplanned/unintended water transfers. Third, there is a growing
recognition of the high potential for areas experiencing water scarcity to use demand-
management approaches instead of relying on inter- and/or intra-basin water transfers. Virtual
water transfer can increase or decrease the demand for water transfers, depending on what
the recipient basin imports and exports and its water demand implications.  In all cases, there
is a need for rigorous planning that considers the likely trajectory of water use, what can be
realistically expected from demand-management and other non-physical interventions, and
develop reasonable plans for the prudent development of transfers, where appropriate.
In situations where there are suitable sources of surplus water and a growing demand in
a water deficit area, it is not a question of whether the transfer will occur or not, but rather
when, and how much water will transfer and how to implement the transfer in ways that reduce
negative impacts. We, therefore, argue that good economics (benefits higher for all), good
politics (reduce conflicts, assess whether plans will yield equitable and reasonable benefits)
and good environmental management are pre-conditions for acceptable water transfers.
Achieving this is generally not easy as illustrated by the case studies we reviewed.
Based on the analysis of the case studies, we surmise that water transfer schemes are
more likely to succeed where: (a) the recipient basin/area is utilizing its water efficiently
through appropriate demand-management, and that the proposed water transfer is the most
cost-effective means of securing additional water; (b) the donor basin has enough water to
meet its current and future needs (including environmental) and a surplus that can be367
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transferred; (d) environmental and social costs in the areas donating and receiving the water
and in the areas/facilities linking the exporting and receiving areas can be reduced to
acceptable levels; (d) cooperation and benefits sharing arrangements that result in a ‘win-
win’ or at least ‘win-no lose’ situations can be established; and (e) the processes and
structures create an enabling environment for effective consultation and negotiations and
for more effective strategic and pro-active approaches to address emerging challenges
and opportunities.
Lessons for the NRLP
The key lessons for the NRLP are:
1. A wide range of water transfer options exist depending on the objectives, geographical
scope, route, arrangement and operation criteria of the water transfer scheme. This
increases the flexibility of integrating water transfers with other water management
strategies and of implementing water transfers in the most prudent ways.
2. In most cases, cost-effective mitigation measures now exist but have not been
highlighted in the planning stages nor implemented in part because the approaches
proposed are viewed as unrealistic and burdensome by the decision makers, and also
because the incentive structures for and political interest in large-scale developments
dissipates once they are operational. The subsequent non-performance of the
mitigation measures and inadequate information on the positive effects of the project
after development, results in a general negative perception of the impact.
3. High transaction costs and risks are the two main factors that can dissuade potential
partners in water transfer. Transaction costs may include legal fees, costs of public
agency review, costs of required technical studies and oversight of the implementation,
and costs involved in settling claims from third parties. Risks may be related to politics
and associated conflicts, to climatic changes, to unilateral actions of water donors
that might reduce the amount of water available for transfer, and to structural failure
particularly for long distance water transfers.
4. Water transfer options can only be explored comprehensively and their acceptability
negotiated if there is an enabling environment. The following institutional changes
may be required: (a) legislation that stipulates that the minimum flow requirements of
the donor basin are met, and that the recipient basin must prove that it has used
every reasonable method to develop and conserve its own resources before looking
outwards; (b) creation of the offices of environmental and water transfer ombudsman
through which grievances may be aired and credible information sought and effectively
used to inform consultations and negotiations; (c) use of innovative water transfer
arrangements such as water banks and markets; and (d) appropriate water, cost and
benefit sharing arrangements.
5. Effective planning, design and implementation are constrained by inadequate
understanding of the system, and how it is likely to respond to hydrologic changes
induced by the water transfer. The process is further constrained by: (a) lack of368
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comprehensive impact studies, follow up monitoring and adaptive management; (b)
inadequate coordination of environmental, engineering and socioeconomic studies;
(c) geographic or issue bias depending on data availability and political influence;
and (d) the divergence of opinions, and in some cases reluctance to change, between
those for and those against the transfer. Tools and methods are needed to improve
the understanding of such complex systems and their responses and to facilitate the
use of credible information in the complex consultation and negotiation processes.
Guidelines on how to plan, design and implement acceptable water transfer schemes
would ensure that consistent approaches and methods are applied and, thereby
increase the chances of arriving at a consensus on water transfer impacts.
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Appendix 1.
Impacts by Zones
Zone Hydrologic changes Environmental Social-economic
Water contributing Barrier to migration of fish
area in the donor species
basin
Loss of some species
Zone downstream Reduced flows Sedimentation Reduced fish catches
of the diversion
point Down-cutting Reduced flood plain usage
of tributaries due to









Water transfer Increased seepage Water quality deterioration Increased health risks
route zone loss and groundwater in open canals
recharge Loss of or damage to sites
Salinization due to seepage of archaeological, historical
and cultural values
Transfer of disease vectors
and pathogens Loss of homelands and
culture of indigenous
Increase mosquito habitat people
Introduction of alien species
Zone below water Increased flow and Reduced bank stabilization as Increased flood plain usage
transfer point in the changes in seasonality a result of increased flows
recipient basin of flows Loss of homelands and
Reduced deterioration of culture of indigenous






water transfer in the
recipient basin
Other outside these
zones but dependent
on goods and
services derived
from these zones.